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Abstract
Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power
systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize
a global performance objective, resulting in social optimization, or try to satisfy their own selfish
objectives using a noncooperative differential game. However, in these solutions, large volumes of
data must be sent from system states to possibly distant control inputs, thus resulting in high cost
of the underlying communication network. To enable economically-viable communication, a game-
theoretic framework is proposed under the communication cost, or sparsity, constraint, given by the
number of communicating state/control input pairs. As this constraint tightens, the system transitions
from dense to sparse communication, providing the trade-off between dynamic system performance and
information exchange. Moreover, using the proposed sparsity-constrained distributed social optimization
and noncooperative game algorithms, we develop a method to allocate the costs of the communication
infrastructure fairly and according to the agents’ diverse needs for feedback and cooperation. Numerical
results illustrate utilization of the proposed algorithms to enable and ensure economic fairness of wide-
area control among power companies.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent networked dynamic systems arise in many practical scenarios where the communi-
cating entities are spatially separated or have different economic priorities, e.g., in cyber-physical
power networks, multi-vehicle formation, intelligent transportation, industrial automation, etc [1].
Social optimization can be performed when all agents aim to jointly optimize a system-wide
objective while a noncooperative differential game is suitable when their objectives are different
[2]. The linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) optimization objectives are frequently employed in the
literature due to their tractability, feasibility of distributed implementation, and broad applicability
of the quadratic utility function [2]–[5].
A networked multi-agent dynamic system with multiple nodes is illustrated in Fig.1. Every
agent owns a subset of nodes, where each node contains several states and control inputs.
To achieve a desired performance objective, it is often necessary to employ state or output
feedback. In this paper, frequently used assumptions of LQR optimization and static state
feedback are employed [3]. Without loss of generality, we define the feedback links from
states to control inputs within one node as local feedback links, which incur negligible expense,
and the feedback links across different nodes as communication links. The traditional state-
feedback centralized LQR optimization [3] and the linear-quadratic games [2], [4], [5] require a
dense feedback matrix and, thus, communication links from every state to every control input,
which necessitates significant information exchange among the system nodes, and, thus, large
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Fig. 1: The communication structure of the multi-agent system.
3communication infrastructure investment to assure desired rate and delay constraints. Due to
wide applicability of proposed methods, we do not assume specific communication medium or
network topology. Instead, we address the following question: how to reduce the communication
cost, given by the number of communication links (see Fig.1), while maintaining desired control
objectives? To answer this question, we develop a family of sparse designs, which provide a
trade-off between the communication cost and control performance, and reveal the most critical
communication links. By limiting the number of communicating state/control input pairs, we
reduce the overall bill for leasing bandwidth in an existing network or investment in a dedicated
communication infrastructure. However, computation of the actual economic benefit depends on
specific communication technology and application and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Sparsity-constrained optimization has been investigated in [6], [7], and state-feedback optimal-
control LQR algorithms for sparsity promotion were addressed in [8], [9]. However, these
methods employ global optimization objectives and centralized implementation, which limit their
applicability to multi-agent systems. Moreover, distributed approaches in the literature [10], [11]
cannot accommodate specified sparsity constraints and different optimization objectives of the
agents.
In this paper, we investigate LQR optimization for dynamic systems with linear state feedback
under the constraint on the communication cost, i.e. the sparsity constraint, given by the number
of communication links, expressed in terms of the off-diagonal cardinality of the state feedback
matrix. First, to solve the centralized sparsity-constrained optimization problem, we employ the
greedy Gradient Support Pursuit (GraSP) algorithm [6], which was shown to provide accurate
approximations to sparsity-constrained solutions for a wide class of optimization functions.
The proposed method also utilizes the restricted Newton step [12] to speed up convergence.
Second, we develop a noncooperative linear-quadratic game among the agents, under the global
communication cost constraint. To compute a Nash equilibrium of this game, we combine the
ideas of GraSP and iterative gradient descent approaches [13], [14]. In the resulting algorithm,
the computation of the players’ (agents’) utilities is distributed and requires limited information
exchange. Third, we convert the proposed noncooperative game into a potential game [14] where
the players’ utilities agree, thus producing a sparsity-constrained distributed social optimization.
The games developed in this paper can be viewed as Network Formation Games (NFGs) [15]
since players take strategic moves to form a network from states to control inputs. Moreover,
4using the above algorithms, we apply cooperative NFG theory [15] and the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) [16], [17] to allocate the costs of communication among the agents proportionally
to the benefits they derive from sparsity-constrained feedback and cooperation. This network
cost allocation method improves on our previous WAC cost allocation approaches [18], [19],
which employed heuristics, relied on the centralized optimization in [8], and extrapolated the
costs of a dense network [5] to sparse scenarios. Finally, we present numerical results for an
example of wide-area control (WAC) of power systems, which helps in suppression of inter-
area power oscillations, but potentially requires a substantial investment in the communication
network needed to exchange state feedback information [8], [19]–[24]. These results are shown
vs. the sparsity constraint, from dense feedback [5] to the decentralized implementation [19],
thus illustrating the trade-off between the communication cost and the control performance.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Development and analysis of centralized and distributed social optimization algorithms and
a noncooperative linear-quadratic game for multi-agent LQR optimal control with static
linear state feedback under the constraint on the number of communicating state-control
input pairs;
• Development of fair network cost allocation algorithm under sparsity constraints;
• Enabling sparsity-constrained designs and network cost allocation for a multi-area power
system that employs wide-area control.
This paper is organized as follows. The system model and the communication-cost-constrained
social optimization is presented in Section II. In Section III, the multi-agent system model is
developed, and the sparsity-constrained distributed differential games are discussed. Section IV
describes the proposed network cost allocation algorithm. In Section V, we present an example
of utilizing the proposed methods for WAC of power systems. Numerical results and discussion
for the Australian power system example are contained in Section VI. Finally, some concluding
remarks are made in Section VII.
5II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THE COMMUNICATION-COST-CONSTRAINED CENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION
The linear dynamic system with n nodes illustrated in Fig.1 is described by the following
state-space equation.
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Dw(t), x0(t) = 0. (1)
where x(t)=(XT1 (t), ...,XTn (t))T∈Rm×1 is the vector of states, Xj∈Rmj×1 is the vector of
states for node j∈{1, ..., n}, mj is the number of states in node j, m =
∑n
j=1mj , u(t) =
(U1(t)T, ...,Un(t)T)T ∈ Rq×1 is the vector of control inputs, Uj ∈ Rpj×1 is the the vector of
control input of node j, pj is the number of control inputs in node j, q =
∑n
j=1 pj , w(t) is a
scalar impulse disturbance input, and A,B,D are matrices with appropriate dimensions, among
which matrix A determines the physical topology of the system [3].
We assume linear static feedback is employed, and thus the control input satisfies
u(t) = −Kx(t) (2)
where K ∈ Rq×m is the feedback gain matrix, with u(t) = (u1(t), ..., uq(t))T, and x(t) =
(x1(t), ..., xm(t))
T
. If the coefficient Kij 6= 0, the system (shown in Fig.1) contains a com-
munication link that delivers the data of state j to control input i. We will refer to the tuple
(xj(t), ui(t)) where j = 1, ..., m, and i = 1, ..., q, as a state-control input link in the rest of the
paper. Since the states x(t) and the control inputs u(t) are organized according to their physical
locations, the matrix K is in the form
K =


K11 K12 · · · K1n
K21 K22 · · · K2n
.
.
.
Kn1 Kn2 · · · Knn


(3)
where the block Kij ∈ Rpi×mj represents feedback of the states of node j to the control inputs
of node i, with i = j corresponding to local feedback and i 6= j — to communication links
(see Fig.1). Without loss of generality, we define the communication cost as the number of
communication links associated with the off-diagonal blocks of K, given by
cardoff(K) =
n∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
nnz(Kij) (4)
6where nnz(·) operator counts the number of nonzero elements in a matrix. The proposed
algorithms can be easily adapted to other sparsity criteria. Additional notation used in the
algorithms is described in Table I.
For the model (1, 2), the social global LQR objective function is given by [3]
J(K) =
∫ ∞
t=0
[x(t)TQx(t) + u(t)TRu(t)]dt (5)
where Q and R are the positive semidefinite and positive definite design matrices with dimen-
sions m×m and q× q, respectively. The minimization of (5) with respect to K results in dense
feedback, i.e., communication links from every state to every control input.
TABLE I: Notation used in the Algorithms 1 and 2.
Term Definition
||K||2 Frobenius norm of the matrix K, defined by trace(KTK).
supp(K) The support set of the matrix K, i.e., the set of indices of the nonzero entries of matrix K [6].
[K]s The matrix obtained by preserving only the s largest-magnitude entries of the matrix K, and
setting all other entries to zero.
K
off The matrix obtained by preserving only the off-diagonal blocks of the matrix K (see (3)) and
setting all other entries to zero.
K
diag The matrix obtained by preserving the diagonal blocks of the matrix K and setting all other
entries to zero.
∇KJ(K) The gradient of the scalar function J(K) with respect to the matrix K [25]. Assuming K ∈
R
m×n
, ∇KJ(K) is given by a m× n matrix with the elements [∇KJ(K)]ij = ∂J/∂Kij .
∇KJ(K)|T The gradient of the scalar function J(K) with respect to the matrix K projected onto the index
set T . The matrix ∇KJ(K)|T is obtained by preserving only the entries of ∇KJ(K) with
indices in the set T and setting other entries to zero.
∆nwt(K, T ) The restricted Newton step of function f(K) at matrix K ∈ Rm×n under the structural
constraint supp(K) ⊂ T . First, the mn×1 vector x is computed by stacking the columns
of K, and the function g(x) is defined as g(x) , f(K). Then the mn×1 restricted Newton
step vector ∆nwt(x, T ) of g(x) at x [6] is computed using the conjugate gradient (CG) method
[9]. The vector ∆nwt(x, T ) is then converted into an m×n matrix by stacking the consecutive
m×1 segments of ∆nwt(x,T ).
7Next, we formulate the social optimization under the communication cost constraint s:
min
K
J(K)
s.t. cardoff(K) ≤ s
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Dw(t)
u(t) = −Kx(t) (6)
The optimization (6) produces a system with at most s state-control input links. Direct solution of
(6) can have combinatorial complexity [6], so we utilize a numerically efficient GraSP method
[6] in the proposed centralized Algorithm 1. Given the overall sparsity constraint s, in each
iteration of Step 2(1–4), the algorithm extends the matrix K along its steepest 2s gradient-
descent directions. In Step 2(1), the gradient of J(K) over K is computed as [12]
∇KJ(K) = 2(RK −BTP )L (7)
where the matrices P and L are the unique solutions of the following Lyaponuv equations
(A−BK)TP + P (A−BK) +Q+KTRKT = 0
(A−BK)L+L(A−BK)T +DDT = 0 (8)
In Step 2(4), the matrix K is updated using the restricted Newton step, and the step size λ is
chosen via the Armijo line search [26]. In Step 2(5), pruning is performed to impose the constraint
s. To guarantee stability of the feedback matrix after pruning, we provide a backtracking option
to return to a previously found stable solution, which has s− 1 or fewer communication links.
(The stopping criterion in Step 2(6) was also used to determine convergence in the sparsity-
promotion algorithm [8].) Note that in Step 2(6), q is the total number of control inputs, and m
is the total number of states. Note also that as s grows, the algorithm retains the links that are
the most critical for minimizing the objective (5).
III. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODEL AND COMMUNICATION-COST-CONSTRAINED
LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES
Suppose that there are r agents, where the agent i owns ni nodes in the system (1) as shown
in Fig.1. Without loss of generality, the nodes are partitioned as follows
8Algorithm 1 Minimizing the centralized LQR objective under the global communication cost
constraint s.
1 Initialization
K :=K0
2 Iteration
while stopping criteria are not met do
(0)Kprev :=K
(1) Compute gradient of J(K) w.r.t K: g = ∇KJ(K)
(2) Identify up to 2s off-diagonal block directions: Z = supp([goff ]2s)
(3) Merge support: T = Z ∪ supp(K).
(4) Descend using the Newton step of J restricted to T : K :=K + λ∆nwt(K, T ).
(5) Prune communication links: K :=Kdiag + [Koff ]s
(6) Stopping criterion:
||K −Kprev||2 < ǫabs√qm+ ǫrel||Kprev||2
end while
3 Polishing
I = supp(K)
while not ||∇KJ |I||2/√qm < ǫ2 do
Descend using the Newton step of J restricted to I:
K :=K + λ∆nwt(K, I).
end while
S1 = {1, 2, ..., n1} ⇒ belongs to agent 1.
S2 = {n1 + 1, n1 + 2, ..., n1 + n2} ⇒ belongs to agent 2.
. . . ⇒ . . .
Sr = {n1 + n2 + ...+ nr−1 + 1, ..., n} ⇒ belongs to agent r.
(9)
We can rewrite the states and control inputs of each agent i in (1) as follows:
x˙i(t) =
r∑
k=1
Aikxk(t) +
r∑
k=1
Bikuk(t) +Diw(t) (10)
9

u1(t)
.
.
.
ur(t)

 = −


K1
.
.
.
Kr

 · x(t) (11)
where xi(t) = (XTn1+...+ni−1+1(t), ...,XTn1+...+ni(t))T∈ RMi×1 is the vector of states for agent
i, with Mi =
∑n1+...+ni
j=n1+...+ni−1+1
mj ; ui(t)=[UTn1+...+ni−1+1(t), . . . ,UTn1+...+ni(t)]T ∈ RNi×1 is the
vector of control inputs for agent i, with Ni=
∑n1+...+ni
j=n1+...+ni−1+1
pj , K
i is the submatrix of K
associated with the control inputs of the agent i, Di is the control matrix for the disturbance
input that enters agent i, and D = col(D1, ...,Dr).
Next, we briefly summarize results on linear-quadratic games for this system [2], [5]. The
agents in (9) are viewed as players that optimize their individual, or selfish, objectives Ji by
selecting their control inputs ui(t), for i = 1, ..., r. The selfish objective of the player i is given
by
Ji(u1,u2, ...,ur)=
∫ ∞
t=0
[x(t)Qix(t)
T+ui(t)
TRiui(t)]dt (12)
where Ri∈RNi×Ni , and Qi∈Rm×m are positive semidefinite and positive definite matrices,
respectively, chosen to improve the ith user’s objective. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is achieved
when it is impossible for any player to improve its objective function by unilaterally changing
its strategy. At a given NE, the players employ Nash strategies (u∗1(t),u∗2(t), ...,u∗r(t)) defined
as [2]
Ji(u
∗
i (t),u
∗
−i(t))≤Ji(ui(t),u∗−i(t)), ∀ui(t), t=[0,∞) (13)
for ∀i∈{1, ...r}, where u−i(t):=(u1(t), . . . ,ui−1(t),ui+1(t), . . . ,ur(t)) is the tuple of strategies
formed by all players except for the player i. When state feedback is employed (11), the Nash
strategies u∗i (t) in eq.(13) can be determined by solving the cross-coupled algebraic Riccati
equations (CARE) (eq.(8) in [5]), where the solution to CARE exists and is unique when the
system is weakly coupled. However, CARE produces a dense feedback matrix [5], and, thus,
communication links from every state to every control input.
To limit the communication cost in a noncooperative scenario, we formulate a linear-quadratic
noncooperative NFG where the players can establish at most s state-control input communication
links (see Fig.1) while each player aims to minimize its selfish LQR objective (12). A Nash
Equilibrium of this game results in a communication network with cost bounded by s. Thus,
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Nash strategies (u∗1(t),u∗2(t), ...,u∗r(t)) satisfy for ∀i ∈ {1, ..., r}
Ji(u
∗
i (t),u
∗
−i(t)) ≤ Ji(ui(t),u∗−i(t)) , ∀ui(t)
s.t. cardoff(K) ≤ s (14)
Equivalently, since linear static feedback (11) is employed, the strategy of player i is given by the
submatrix K i in (11), and Nash strategies are expressed as (K1∗,K2∗, ...,Kr∗), which satisfy
for each i ∈ {1, ..., r}
Ji(K
i∗,K−i
∗
) ≤ Ji(K i,K−i∗) , ∀K i
s.t. cardoff(K) ≤ s (15)
where the tuple K−i := (K1, ...,K i−1,K i+1, ...,Kr) represents the strategies of all other
players except i. In this case, as s increases, the optimization (15) retains the most critical
state-control input links needed for the noncooperative optimization, characterized by the set of
selfish objectives (12).
The proposed game is described in Algorithm 2. It is inspired by the iterative gradient descent
methods in [13], [14], where each player takes a small step towards minimizing its own objective
while other players’ strategies are fixed. In each step associated with player i, we use the GraSP
algorithm [6] to update the strategic variableK i while maintaining the overall sparsity constraint.
Thus, in the submatrixK i (11), the elements representing local feedback, i.e., those in the blocks
Kjj ∈ Rpj×mj in (3) for j ∈ Si, are free variables while the off-diagonal blocks in (3) are subject
to the sparsity constraint. The computation of the gradient of Ji w.r.t. player i’s strategy K i is
similar to that in (7–8).
∇KiJi(K i,K−i) = 2(RiK i −DTP¯i)L¯i (16)
where P¯i and L¯i are the unique solutions of the following Lyapunov equations
(A¯i −BiK i)TP¯i + P¯i(A¯i −BiK i) +Qi +K iTRiK i = 0
(A¯i −BiK i)L¯i + L¯i(A¯i −BiK i)T +DDT = 0 (17)
and A¯i = A−
∑r
j=1,j 6=iBjK
j
, Bj = col(B1j , ...,Brj).
Algorithm 2 is distributed in the sense that player i individually updates its strategic variable
K i. Each player has prior knowledge of the underlying physical system (i.e., the matrices
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A,B,D in (1)) and broadcasts its strategic move (the submatrix K i) after its strategy is updated
at the completion of Step 2(6) and each inner loop of Step 3.
Algorithm 2 Noncooperative game under the global communication cost constraint s.
1 Initialization
K :=K0
Initialize the link constraint si for each player i , i = 1, ..., r,
∑r
i=1 si = s.
2 Iteration
while stopping criteria are not met do
Kprev :=K
for i = 1 . . . r do
(1) if i > 1, si = s− cardoff(K−i).
(2) Compute gradient of Ji in (12) w.r.t K i:
gi = ∇KiJi(K i,K−i)
(3) Identify up to 2si off-diagonal block directions: Z = supp([goffi ]2si)
(4) Merge support: T = Z ∪ supp(K i).
(5) Descend using the Newton step of Ji restricted to T : K i :=K i + λ∆nwt(K i, T ).
(6) Prune among the off-diagonal block elements: K i :=K i,diag + [K i,off ]si
end for
Construct global feedback matrix: K = [K1; ...;Kr].
Stopping criteria:
||K −Kprev||2 < ǫabs√qm+ ǫrel||Kprev||2.
end while
3 Polishing
Ii = supp(K i), for i = 1, ..., r.
while not ∇KiJi|Ii < ǫ2 ∀i = 1, ..., r do
for i = 1, ..., r do
Descend using the Newton step of Ji restricted to Ii: K i :=K i + λ∆nwt(K i, Ii).
end for
end while
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Finally, note that the social optimization under the sparsity constraint (6) can also be imple-
mented in a distributed fashion using a potential game [14], obtained from (15) by replacing the
individual objectives in (15) with the common social objective (5) while the players’ strategies
are still defined as their control vectors. We refer to this game as distributed social optimization,
and its equilibria are defined as
J(K i
∗
,K−i
∗
) ≤ J(K i,K−i∗) , ∀K i
s.t. cardoff(K) ≤ s (18)
To compute (18), we use Algorithm 2, where the social objective J() replaces Ji() in Step 2(2)
and in the Polishing Step 3.
Finally, we discuss the NEs of the proposed games. Since the LQR objective (5) is not convex
in the feedback matrix K in general [25], the noncooperative game (14, 15) is not guaranteed
to admit a pure-strategy NE [27]. On the other hand, the distributed social optimization (18) is
an exact potential game, and, thus, a pure NE exists for this game [14]. Moreover, the optimal
solution of the social optimization problem (6) constitutes a NE of (18) although the converse
does not necessarily hold due to nonconvexity of the LQR objective. Finally, while CARE has
a unique NE under the weakly-coupled system assumption [5], the cost-constrained games (14),
(18) can have multiple NEs.
IV. NETWORK COST ALLOCATION
First, we review relevant results for cooperative NFGs with transferable utility [28] where
the utility of a coalition is viewed as monetary value, which is distributed among the players.
Suppose r players cooperatively form a network with the objective of maximizing their payoffs.
Several approaches to fair payoff allocation have been proposed in the literature [16], [17], [29],
[30]. We employ the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) due to its computational efficiency in
NFGs [16], [17]. The NBS payoff allocation algorithm proceeds in three steps based on [17]:
(1) The players cooperate to construct a network that maximizes the global social payoff vsoc;
(2) The disagreement point is computed as
v = (v1, v2..., vr) (19)
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where the selfish payoff vi is the minimum payoff that the ith player is willing to accept. For
example, (19) can be computed as a NE of a noncooperative NFG where each player aims to
satisfy its own selfish objective;
(3) The overall payoff vsoc is split among the players, with the allocated payoff of player i
given by [17]
αi = vi +
vsoc −
∑r
k=1 vk
r
. (20)
Note that bargaining is successful when the payoff of the social network is at least as large as
Algorithm 3 Network Cost Allocation under the Communication Cost Constraint s.
1 Find social optimized objective Jsoc(s)
Jsoc(s) is the optimized objective of (6) or (18) under constraint s;
2 Find decoupled optimized objectives at DNE.
(1) The NE (15) for s = 0 is the decoupled NE (DNE);
(2) Optimized selfish objective at DNE:JDi , i = 1, ..., r.
(3) Total objective at DNE: J˜D :=∑ri=1 JDi .
3 Find coupled optimized objectives at CNE
(1) The NE (15) under constraint s is coupled NE (CNE(s));
(2) Optimized selfish objective at CNE: JCi (s), i = 1, ..., r
(3) Total objective at CNE(s): J˜C(s) =∑ri=1 JCi (s).
4 Compute and allocate payoffs and network costs
(1) The social payoff: vsoc(s) = J˜D − Jsoc(s)
(2) The selfish payoffs (the disagreement point):
vi(s) = J
D
i − JCi (s), i = 1, ..., r;
(3) The allocated payoffs:
αi(s) = vi(s) +
vsoc(s)−
∑r
k=1 vk(s)
r
(4) Proportional allocation of the network cost:
Ci(s) = αi(s)/
∑r
i=1 αi(s), i = 1, ..., r.
14
the sum of the selfish payoffs, i.e.,
vsoc ≥
r∑
i=1
vi (21)
or equivalently, each player’s allocated payoff is at least as large as its selfish payoff:
ξ = αi − vi ≥ 0. (22)
From (22), all players benefit equally by forming the social network.
Next, we describe the proposed network cost allocation method for sparsity-constrained multi-
agent dynamic systems, which is summarized in Algorithm 3. Given the global communication
cost constraint s, in steps 1–3, three different scenarios are analyzed, depending on whether
the agents employ: (i) non-local feedback, i.e., communication bounded by cost s; and (ii)
cooperation. In Step 1, both (i) and (ii) are assumed, resulting in the social optimization,
implemented using Algorithm 1 or 2 under the constraint s. In contrast, in Step 2 neither (i) nor
(ii) are employed, and thus the agents play the decoupled noncooperative game, i.e., (14) with
s = 0, which results in a decentralized system using the Polishing Step 3 of Algorithm 2 (see
[19]). Finally, in Step 3, only (i) is employed, resulting in the coupled game, i.e., (14) with the
global constraint s, implemented using Algorithm 2. Note that Steps 1 and 3 optimize systems
with (at most) s communication links (see Fig.1), while Step 2 restricts communication to local
feedback links.
In Steps 4(1) and 4(2), the payoffs vsoc(s) and vi(s) represent the improvement in control
performance, or objective reduction, provided by communication bounded by cost s with (in Step
1) and without (in Step 3) cooperation, respectively, relative to the decentralized implementation
(Step 2). It is reasonable to model the minimum payoff an agent i expects from communication
by its selfish objective reduction, or selfish payoff, vi(s), thus forming the disagreement point.
The allocated payoffs αi(s) are computed in Step 4(3). Note that the NBS algorithm interprets
the payoffs αi(s) and vi(s) as values (e.g., monetary payoffs) that agent i derives from com-
munication with and without cooperation, respectively (see (19, 20)). If cooperation does not
degrade the minimum acceptable value vi(s), i.e., if (21, 22) hold, then bargaining is successful,
and the agents agree to use the links formed by the social optimization found in Step 1, which
provides them with the social payoff vsoc(s) and the individual payoffs αi(s), i = 1...r. The
latter condition is satisfied for a practical scenario where, in (5) and (12), the matrix R is
15
block-diagonal with diagonal blocks given by Ri, i = 1, ..., r, and
r∑
i=1
Qi = Q (23)
In this case,
∑r
i=1 Ji(K) = J(K)
1, ∀K, and thus a NE of the noncooperative game (13) is a
feasible solution of the social optimization (6) for the same value of constraint s, resulting in
Jsoc(s) ≤ J˜C(s) (see Step 1 and 3(3)), which is equivalent to (21).
We assume that the grand coalition forms in the proposed cooperative game among the agents.
This assumption justifies Step 1 in Alg. 3, where all players cooperate. A sufficient condition
for this assumption is efficiency of the grand coalition [31]. We show in [32] that a practical
coalition-level identity similar to (23) guarantees efficiency of the grand coalition.
If cooperation is successful, the feedback data required for implementing the social control
strategy (as specified by the optimal feedback matrix in (6) or (18)) will be delivered by the
communication network specific to the given medium and application, where the constraint s is
chosen based on the desired performance/cost tradeoff. In the final Step 4(4), we compute each
agent’s share of the cost of this network proportionally to the allocated payoffs αi(s). Note that
if ξ(s) in (22) is small relative to the average of the selfish payoffs vi(s) (or Jsoc(s) ≈ J˜C(s)),
the benefit of cooperation (ii) is small relative to that of communication (i), and the agents’
costs Ci(s) can vary significantly due to the agents’ diverse needs for feedback and cooperation
as is illustrated in Section VI and in [19]. On the other hand, when ξ(s) is relatively large,
i.e., αi(s) ≈ ξ(s) for all i, the payoffs equalize (22), resulting in equally split cost of the
communication network among the agents.
V. EXAMPLE: SPARSITY-CONSTRAINED WIDE-AREA CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS
We validate our algorithms using the example of wide-area control (WAC) of large-scale
power system networks. In recent literature such as [8], [21], WAC has been shown to be very
useful for suppressing low-frequency oscillations following small-signal disturbances in large
power grids, at the cost of communicating real-time data from sensors at one operating region
to controllers at others. The sensors are referred to as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs),
1Ji(K) is equivalent to (12). Since we use full state feedback, and the control input u(t) = −Kx(t) is equivalent to (11),
the objective Ji(u1,u2, ...,ur) is a function of K and can be expressed as Ji(K).
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all of which are synchronized to each other via GPS. The envisioned architecture for PMU
data exchange in the US power grid, also referred to as the North American Synchrophasor
Initiative Network, or NASPInet [20], involves PMUs located at substations of different utility
companies sending their measurements to controllers at remote generators through a wide-area
communication network such as the Internet. To reduce the cost of this communication, sparsity
promotion for WAC was studied in [8], [9]. However, these designs employed social centralized
implementation. In contrast, our approach is to design distributed controllers for WAC that are
efficient with respect to communication costs. Moreover, we address the question posed in [20]
on financing the communication network among the power companies. While the envisioned
NASPInet has many functions beyond WAC, fair allocation of network costs associated with
delivery of feedback data is necessary to develop its overall pricing scheme.
We model a power transmission system using (1,9–11) and as in Fig.1, where a node represents
a generator while an agent (player) represents the operating territory (area) owned by a utility
company. Following [8], [19], we express WAC as an LQR problem for minimizing the closed-
loop energy of the system states, which equivalently translates into reducing the oscillations in
their dynamic response. The LQR objective in (5) aims to damp the power oscillations captured
by the small-signal changes around the nominal values while spending a reasonable amount of
control effort [8], where the matrices Q and R in (5) are chosen to reduce the energies of the
state and control vectors, respectively. Therefore, in the rest of this paper we will refer to the
objective (e.g., in (5), (12), Algorithm 3, etc.) as energy and to the payoffs vsoc(s) and vi(s) in
Algorithm 3 (Step 4 (1 and 2)) as energy savings.
Typically a 3rd-order model of synchronous generators, including two swing states and one
excitation state (for details, please see [21]) suffices for solving most WAC problems since the
goal is to influence the electro-mechanical dynamics of these generators. Note that the 3rd-order
model indicates mj = 3 and pj = 1, ∀j = 1, ..., n in the general state-space model (1). We
consider a power system with n synchronous generators, divided into r non-overlapping areas,
and define the states of the jth generator accordingly as
XTj (t) = (∆δj(t),∆ωj(t),∆Ej(t)) , (24)
where the elements represent small-signal changes in phase angle, frequency, and excitation
voltage, respectively. If higher-order models are considered, then the last term can be simply
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replaced by a vector x−j that collects all states except for the phase and the frequency. We
assume full state availability, which can be achieved by placing PMUs at every generator bus,
or by running a prior state estimation loop. We assume the matrix D in (1) to be an indicator
matrix with all elements zero except for the one corresponding to the acceleration equation of
the generator at which the fault w(t) happens.
Next, we describe the choice of matrices in the social (5) and the selfish (12) energy opti-
mization. We set R in (5) and Ri (12) as the identity matrix as to achieve the same weight for
the energy of every control input. The matrix Q in (5) is chosen so that all generators arrive
at a consensus in their small-signal changes in phase angles and frequencies, as dictated by the
physical topology of the network [8], [19]. Considering the small-signal-model in Kron-reduced
form [21], for the 3rd order model, Q in (5) is determined from (25)
Estates =


∆δ
∆ω
∆E


T 

L¯
L¯
I


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′


∆δ
∆ω
∆E


= xT (PTQ′P)x = xTQx
=
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=k+1
[(∆δj −∆δk)2 + (∆ωj −∆ωk)2] +
n∑
j=1
∆E2j , (25)
where P is a permutation matrix that rearranges the state vector x in (1) by stacking all the
angles first, then all the frequencies, then the excitation voltages. For the general case (1), the
∆ET∆E term in (25) is replaced by (x−)Tx−, where the latter is obtained by stacking the
terms x−j . The matrix L¯ = nI−1n ·1Tn [32], where 1n ∈ Rn×1 is the column vector of all ones,
and I is the identity matrix.
To quantify the ith player’s selfish objective (12), we define two quantities, namely, intra-area
energy and inter-area energy, from the perspective of the ith player as follows:
Eintrai (x) :=
∑
k∈si
∑
j∈si
j>k
[
(∆δk −∆δj)2 + (∆ωk −∆ωj)2
]
+
∑
k∈si
∆E2k (26)
Einteri (x) :=
1
2
∑
k∈si
∑
j=1,...,n,
j /∈si
[
(∆δk −∆δj)2 + (∆ωk −∆ωj)2
]
(27)
It can be seen that the intra-area energy of area i is designed for the consensus in the phase angle
and frequency states of the generators in area i. The inter-area energy is modeled by collecting
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the power transfer terms associated with a generator in area i and a generator in another area, and
attributing 1/2 of this energy to area i. The total state energy associated with area i ∈ {1, ..., r}
is
xTQix = E
intra
i (x) + E
inter
i (x), (28)
where Qi ≥ 0, since (28) is the quadratic form of the states. Detailed derivations of Q and Qi
can be found in [32]. It is easy to show that the resulting LQR objectives (5) and (12) satisfy
(23), thus assuring successful cooperation among the power companies. We illustrate this fact
in the next section by numerical simulation of a 50-bus power system model.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN POWER
SYSTEM MODEL
We validate our results using a 50-bus Australian power system model shown in Fig.2(a),
which consists of 14 synchronous generators, divided into 4 coherent areas, and is a reasonably
accurate representation of the power grid in south-eastern Australia [33]. The area distribution
is shown in different colors in Fig.2(b), with the red dots denoting generator buses. Generators
1 to 5 belong to area 1, 6 and 7 – to area 2, 8 to 11 – to area 3, and 12 to 14 – to area 4.
Each generator is modeled by up to 17 states, namely the generator phase angle, the generator
speed, direct and quadrature axis components of the internal voltage of the generator, direct and
quadrature axis components of the internal flux of the generator, the field excitation voltage,
three states contributed by the automatic voltage regulator (AVR), three states contributed by the
power system stabilizer (PSS), one state contributed by the stabilizing transformer, and finally
three states contributed by supporting induction generators. The small-signal linearized model
is extracted using the MATLAB PST toolbox [34]. However, since we are primarily interested
in the electro-mechanical states, we perform an initial round of model reduction using singular
perturbation and thereby eliminate the non-electromechanical states with very low participation
in the swing dynamics. The exact expressions of the model matrices are not included in the
paper for brevity and are provided in [32]. The small-signal model is excited by impulsive
disturbance inputs entering through the acceleration equation of the generators, and the proposed
LQR controller is actuated through the field excitation voltages, using state feedback from all
generators. Fig.2(b) also illustrates the communication and local feedback links between the
generators.
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(a) Line diagram of the Australian 50-bus system.
generator bus (node) load bus
communication linklocal feedback link
physical transmission line
Area 1 
   (Agent 1) 
Area 3 
   (Agent 3) 
Area 4 
   (Agent 4) 
Area 2
(Agent 2) 
(b) Simplified Australian power system with feedback links.
Fig. 2: A simplified 50-bus representation of the southeast Australian power system [33].
A. Global Energies
Fig.3 shows the global closed-loop energies for the 50-bus system with respect to the com-
munication cost constraints for the various centralized and distributed algorithms discussed in
the previous sections. Global energies of the centralized optimization (6) using Algorithm 1, the
20
0   1   10  100 1000
s
80
85
90
95
100
G
lo
ba
l e
ne
rg
y
Centralized (Alg.1)
Social distributed (Alg.2)
Sparsity-promotion [8]
CNE (Alg.2)
DNE
CARE [5]
Fig. 3: Global energies of social optimization and noncooperative games vs. communication cost constraint.
coupled noncooperative game (CNE) in Step 3 of Algorithm 3, the social distributed optimization
(18) using Algorithm 2, and of the decoupled game (DNE) in Step 2 of Algorithm 3 are included.
We also show the global energy of the iterative dense-feedback method that solves CARE [5]
(note that our system satisfies the weakly coupled condition in [5]) and of the centralized sparsity-
promoting ADMM method [8], modified to satisfy the sparsity constraint. Since the energy of
the method in [8] is nondecreasing with the sparsity parameter γ, a bisection search on γ yields
the smallest value of γ for which the off-diagonal cardinality of the feedback matrix produced
by the ADMM algorithm satisfies the constraint. The choice of the l1-metric weights for this
ADMM implementation is described in [19].
The figure shows that the global closed-loop energies resulting from the social optimization
using Algorithm 1 or 2 are smaller than those of the noncooperative game (CNE using Algorithm
2) for any value of s. This testifies to the fact that the dynamic performance of the grid improves
when companies cooperate with each other to jointly design the controller, which constitutes a
sufficient condition for the cooperation to form according to (21). We also observe that the global
CNE objective (Algorithm 3, Step 3(3)) tends to those of the DNE (Algorithm 3, Step 2(3)) and
CARE as s approaches 0 and its largest value s = 2223, respectively. The former corresponds
to the decentralized case [19] while the latter requires dense communication [5].
Moreover, the energy Jsoc of the distributed social optimization (using Algorithm 2) closely
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approximates that of the centralized Algorithm 1 for most of the s-range. We also observe that
the closed-loop energy of social optimization using Algorithms 1 or 2 is smaller than that using
the sparsity-promoting algorithm in a moderately sparse region, thus providing better reduction
of both intra- and inter-area oscillations when given an exact communication cost constraint.
While the global energies of all sparsity-constrained methods are theoretically nonincreas-
ing with s, the social algorithms might occasionally produce a larger energy as s increases.
This happens when an algorithm converges to a local minimum since the optimization objec-
tive (5) is locally, but not necessarily globally, convex in K [25]. If the algorithm results in
Jsoc(s2)>Jsoc(s1) for s2>s1, we choose a suboptimal solution Jsoc(s2) , Jsoc(s1) (see Algorithm
3, Step 1), which produces a nonincreasing Jsoc(s). Finally, note that the global objectives
(energies) of all algorithms saturate to the same asymptotic value when s exceeds 740, implying
that the communication cost can be reduced by a factor of 3 relative to the cost of the dense
LQR network without compromising the control performance. Thus, in the next figure, we show
results only for small and moderate values of s, where the energies vary significantly.
B. Selfish Energies and Cost Allocation
In Fig.4, we show performance of noncooperative games, as well as payoffs and costs in
Algorithm 3. Fig.4(a) shows the individual energy objectives of the four areas at CNE (Step
3(2)). In Fig.4(b), the selfish energy savings vi(s) (Step 4(2)) for each company, their sum,
the social energy savings vsoc(s) (Step 4(1)), and the payoff increase ξ(s) (22) are illustrated.
We observe that bargaining is successful (see (21)), and there is modest payoff increase due to
cooperation.
Note that while the overall global CNE objective J˜C(s) (Step 3(3)) is theoretically non-
increasing with s, this is not necessarily true for individual selfish energies JCi (s) in Step
3(2), which means that increasing the overall communication budget might degrade some areas’
energies when they act noncooperatively. This phenomenon can result in decreasing and possibly
negative payoffs vi(s) and αi(s) over some regions of the constraint s, which might dissatisfy
the affected players and would require a revision of the proposed cost allocation method in Step
4(4) of Algorithm 3. See, e.g., slightly increasing selfish objective JC3 (s) and negative selfish
payoff v3(s) of area 3 in Fig.4 (a) and (b), respectively, for small values of s. Nevertheless, the
allocated payoffs αi(s) in Algorithm 3 (Step 4(3)) are nonnegative for all companies for the
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Fig. 4: Selfish energies (objectives), payoffs and cost allocation in Algorithm 3 vs. communication cost constraint
s. (a) Selfish energies of noncooperative games for areas 1–4. (b) The energy savings (payoffs) vi(s) and vsoc(s)
and payoff increase ξ(s). (c) Proportional cost allocation.
Australian power system scenario due to sufficient cooperation gain ξ(s). A slightly modified
payoff computation method that guarantees nondecreasing payoffs is presented in Appendix A.
Fig.4 demonstrates significant disparity in the selfish energies JCi (s), the vi(s) values, and
the allocated proportional costs Ci(s) among the areas, which is due to the grid topology. For
example, large selfish energy and allocated cost of area 1 can be explained by its large number
of generators. However, area size is not the only indicator, e.g., area 4 has fewer generators than
area 3, but much larger selfish energy JC4 (s), energy savings v4(s), and allocated cost α4(s),
which even exceed those of area 1 for smaller values of s. In summary, areas 1 and 4 pay a
much greater share of the overall network cost than areas 2 and 3 due to the former areas’
greater needs for feedback and cooperation, which is consistent with relatively steep decline of
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their selfish energies with s in Fig.4(a) and with the fact that in the social optimization, links
among the generators in these areas are the first to be added as s increases. Thus, these links
are the most valuable for achieving energy reduction when using WAC [8].
C. Algorithm Convergence and Implementation Issues
First, we focus on the numerical properties of Algorithms 1 and 2. Since the LQR objective
does not satisfy the Stable Restricted Hessian condition [6], convergence of these algorithms is
not assured in general. However, if Step 2 of Algorithm 1 converges and yields a stabilizing
feedback matrix K, then Step 3 will also converge due to the local convexity of J(K). At
convergence, Step 3 produces a feedback matrix Kˆ that satisfies the basic feasibility property
∇KJ(K)|supp(Kˆ)(K = Kˆ) = 0, which is a weak necessary condition for the optimality of
problem (6) [7]. Similar arguments demonstrate that Algorithm 2 produces a feedback matrix
that satisfies the basic feasibility property of each individual minimization in the CNE problem
(15) (or (18) for social optimization). Note that the decoupled game in Step 2 of Algorithm 3
represents an unconstrained optimization with respect to each player’s strategy, which is given by
its local feedback matrix [19]. This game is implemented using the polishing Step 3 of Algorithm
2. When this implementation converges, the resulting equilibrium point is a local NE [13] due
to local convexity of the LQR objective [25], i.e., the strategy of each player is a local optimum
given other players’ strategies. From these observations, we conclude that convergence properties
of proposed algorithms resemble those of the ADMM-based methods [8]. In both cases, while
theoretical guarantees are not always feasible, extensive numerical experience demonstrates that
the algorithms converge and provide desirable minimization solutions over a range of sparsity
parameters. We found that the proposed sparsity-constrained algorithms also converge and exhibit
similar performance and complexity trends to those shown in this paper for the New England
power system model used in [8].
Next, we describe the algorithm implementation details for the results shown in Fig.3–4.
We found that the proposed algorithms can converge to different stabilizing feedback matrices
given different initial settings. Moreover, for s > 0, the energies of these solutions can differ
significantly. However, we found that the energies of different equilibria were very similar to each
other for the decoupled game implemented using Algorithm 3 (Step 2). We have employed ǫabs =
ǫrel = 10
−4 and ǫ2 = 10−4 and 10−3 in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively, to achieve comparable
24
performance for distributed and centralized social optimizations. For s = 1, both algorithms
were initialized with a stabilizing matrix K0 obtained by preserving the block-diagonal entries
of the dense LQR feedback matrix that optimizes (5) and setting other entries to zero. For larger
s, K0 was chosen as the optimized feedback matrix obtained in a previous computation for
a smaller value of s. We found that this initialization produced the lowest energies over the
entire s-range. If a stable block-diagonal matrix cannot be found, K0 can be obtained using the
sparsity-promotion algorithm [8] with the largest γ that produces a stabilizing feedback matrix
(Similarly, stabilizing feedback might not exist for small values of the constraint s). Moreover,
Algorithm 2 had the best performance when the initial link settings si were chosen proportionally
to the number of nodes ni in (9).
Finally, we found that the computational load of the polishing step dominates the overall
runtime for both algorithms, and the Newton step using the CG method (see Table I, last entry)
is the most computation-intensive operation, which has polynomial complexity in s and the
number of states [9]. In our experiments, all algorithms in Fig.3 converged in less than 103
seconds for any value of s although this did not include the bisection search time for the
modified ADMM method [8], which is very computation-intensive. Moreover, the distributed
social implementation using Algorithm 2 converged much faster than the centralized method
(Algorithm 1)2.
VII. CONCLUSION
LQR optimization under the communication-cost constraint was investigated for multi-agent
dynamic systems with linear static state feedback. First, a communication-cost-constrained cen-
tralized social optimization algorithm was developed. Second, distributed game-theoretic algo-
rithms were investigated for both selfish and social optimization under the sparsity constraint.
Finally, cooperative NFG theory was employed to allocate the costs of the communication
infrastructure in a multi-agent dynamic system. Using a 50-bus power system model divided
into 4 areas, we demonstrated convergence of proposed algorithms and desirable performance
and complexity features of distributed methods over the range of the sparsity constraint, thus
2The experiments are run using MATLAB on a MacBook Pro with Yosemite operating system, 2.6 GHz Intel core i5 processor,
and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory.
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providing a trade-off between the communication cost and the control performance. Furthermore,
we discussed the relationship between the proportionally allocated costs and power companies’
needs for feedback and cooperation, and showed that the proposed cost allocation algorithm is
rooted in the physical topology of the power grid. Our current research focuses on applying
proposed algorithms to systems with uncertainty and communication delays. Moreover, we plan
to extend the concepts of this paper to diverse multi-agent dynamic system applications, robust
optimization objectives, output feedback, and different communication network architectures.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITION OF NONDECREASING SELFISH PAYOFFS FOR ALGORITHM 3
In Section VI-B, we comment that it is possible to define nondecreasing selfish payoffs in
Step 4(2) of Algorithm 3. Given a cost constraint s, such alternative definition is
v∗i (s) = J
D
i −min({JCi (s′)|s′ ≤ s})︸ ︷︷ ︸
J∗i (s)
, i = 1, ..., r (29)
which is the maximum objective improvement an agent i can obtain by searching over the set of
its selfish objectives JCi (s′) with constraints s′ that do not exceed s. If there exists some s′ < s
such that JCi (s′) < JCi (s), the agent i might argue that the smaller selfish objective JCi (s′), not
JCi (s), should be used to compute its payoff since it also satisfies the constraint (s′ < s). It is
easy to show that v∗i (s) in (29) is non-decreasing with s and v∗i (s) ≥ 0, ∀s ≥ 0.
Note that the disagreement point (29) is hypothetical in a sense that a communication network
with the energies J∗i (s) in (29) might not be feasible (different agents might have different
s′ values in (29) for a fixed constraint s). However, noncompatible selfish payoffs are often
employed in the literature to reflect the player’s subjective preferences and are not required to
represent a feasible scenario [16], [17]. Moreover, successful cooperation (21) is not guaranteed
for the payoffs (29). However, we found that bargaining was successful for the power system
example in Section VI, and the payoffs (29) were very similar to the payoffs vi(s) defined in
Algorithm 3 (Step 4(2)), which were shown in Fig.4(b).
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATIONS OF Q AND Qi MATRICES IN SECTION V, EQ. (25,28)
A. Matrix Q in eq. (25)
The permutation matrix P in eq. (25) is
P =

P1
P2

 (30)
where
P2 = diag(T1, T2, ..., Tn). (31)
Ti =
[
0(mi−2)×2 I(mi−2)×(mi−2)
]
(32)
P1 = (pij)2n×s (33)
and
pij =


δj,ki , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
δj,ki+1 , n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n
ki = 1 +
i−1∑
k=1
mk. (34)
Recall that n is the number of nodes in the system, mi is the number of states belonging to node
i, s is the total number of states in the network in (1), and δij is the Kronecker delta function.
The phase angle terms in (25) are given by
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=k+1
(∆δj −∆δk)2
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
(∆δj −∆δk)2
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
|∆δk1n −∆δ|2
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
n∆δ2k − 2∆δi1Tn∆δ +∆δT∆δ
=
1
2
[n∆δT∆δ − 2∆δT1n1Tn∆δ + n∆δT∆δ]
= ∆δT
(
nIn×n − 1n1T
)
∆δ = ∆δTL¯∆δ (35)
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Thus
L¯ = nIn×n − 1n1T. (36)
B. Matrix Qi in eq. (28)
In eq.(24), the intra-area energy for agent i
Eintrai (x) :=
∑
k∈si
∑
j∈si
j>k
(∆δk −∆δj)2 + (∆ωk −∆ωj)2 +
∑
k∈si
∆E2k
=


∆δ
∆ω
∆E


T 

L¯intrai
L¯intrai
I intrai




∆δ
∆ω
∆E

 (37)
where I intrai is a block diagonal matrix with the identity matrix Ini×ni at the ith diagonal block,
and zeros elsewhere.
I intrai = blkdiag(0n1×n1, ..., Ini×ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
the i-th block
, ..., 0nr×nr) (38)
where blkdiag(M1, ...,Mn) represents the block-diagonal matrix with matrices M1, ...,Mn on
the diagonal blocks. The phase angle terms of (26) are given by
∑
k∈si
∑
j∈si
j>k
(∆δk −∆δj)2 = ∆δTL¯intrai ∆δ. (39)
where
LHS = ∆δTi
(
niIni×ni − 1ni1Tni
)
∆δi
= ∆δT · blkdiag(0n1×n1, ..., niIni×ni − 1ni1Tni︸ ︷︷ ︸
the i-th block
, ..., 0nr×nr) ·∆δ
= RHS (40)
Thus
L¯intrai = blkdiag(0n1×n1 , ..., niIni×ni − 1ni1Tni︸ ︷︷ ︸
the i-th block
, ..., 0nr×nr) (41)
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In eq.(27), the inter-area energy for agent i
Einteri (x) =
1
2
∑
k∈si
∑
j=1,...,n,
j /∈si
(∆δk −∆δj)2 + (∆ωk −∆ωj)2
=

∆δ
∆ω


T 
L¯interi
I interi



∆δ
∆ω

 (42)
The phase angle terms of (27) are given by
1
2
∑
k∈si
∑
j=1,...,n,
j /∈si
(∆δk −∆δj)2 = ∆δTL¯interi ∆δ, (43)
We express the LHS as
LHS =
1
2
∑
k∈Si
r∑
j=1,j 6=i
|∆δk1nj −∆δj |2
=
1
2
∑
k∈Si
r∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
∆δk1nj −∆δj
)T (
∆δk1nj −∆δj
)
=
1
2
∑
k∈Si
r∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
nj∆δ
2
k − 2∆δk1Tnj∆δj +∆δTj ∆δj
)
=
1
2
r∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
nj∆δ
T
i ∆δi − 2∆δTi 1ni1Tnj∆δj + ni∆δTj ∆δj
)
=
1
2
[(n− 2ni)∆δTi ∆δi + ni∆δT∆δ − 2(∆δTi 1ni)(1Tn∆δ − 1Tni∆δi)]
= ∆δT(
n− 2ni
2
I intrai )∆δ +∆δT(
ni
2
In×n)∆δ −∆δT(I intrai 1n1Tn (In×n − I intrai ))∆δ
= ∆δT[
n− 2ni
2
I intrai +
ni
2
In×n + I intrai 1n1Tn (In×n − I intrai )]∆δ = RHS, (44)
with
L¯interi =
n− 2ni
2
I intrai +
ni
2
In×n + I intrai 1n1Tn (In×n − I intrai ). (45)
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Thus, according to eq.(28),
xTQix =
∑
k∈si
∑
j∈si
j>k
(∆δk −∆δj)2 + (∆ωk −∆ωj)2 +
∑
k∈si
∆E2k
=


∆δ
∆ω
∆E


T 

L¯intrai + L¯interi
L¯intrai + L¯interi
I intrai


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′i


∆δ
∆ω
∆E


= xT (PTQ′iP)x, (46)
and
Qi = PTQ′iP (47)
APPENDIX C
EFFICIENCY OF THE GRAND COALITION
Consider a coalitional game where the players within each coalition cooperate while different
coalitions compete. Given a coalitional structure ρ = {S1,S2, ...,Sl} and a set of players N =
{1, ..., r}, ρ is defined as a partition if ∀i 6= j, Si ∩ Sj = φ, and ∪li=1Si = N [Saad, 2010]. In
the multi-agent control problem, the control objective of each coalition S ⊂ ρ is denoted as JS ,
given by
JS(K
S ,K−S) =
∫ ∞
t=0
[xT(t)QSx(t) +
∑
j∈S
uTj (t)Rjuj(t)]dt (48)
where KS is the submatrix of the feedback matrix K that represents the strategy of the coalition
S and is given by the union of the submatrices Kj in (11) associated with agents j ∈ S. Under
the sparsity constraint s, the Nash strategies of the coalitions in ρ are expressed as
JS(K
S∗,K−S
∗
) ≤ JS(KS ,K−S∗) , ∀KS
s.t. cardoff(K) ≤ s (49)
Suppose Kρ = (KS1
∗
,KS2
∗
, ...,KSl
∗
) is the feedback matrix when the strategies of the coali-
tions in ρ = {S1, ...,Sl} are at a Nash Equilibrium.
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The value of a coalition S in the partition ρ is defined as the objective reduction of S, with
respect to the decoupled game, i.e.
vρ(S) =
∑
i∈S
JDi − JS(Kρ). (50)
The above coalitional game is in partition form [31] since the value of each coalition depends
on the composition of other coalitions. It is shown in [31] that for coalitonal games in partition
form, the grand coalition N = {1, ..., r} forms when it is efficient, i.e., for any partition ρ, the
value of N is not exceeded by the combined values of the coalitions in ρ:
vN (N ) ≥
∑
S⊂ρ
vρ(S), ∀ρ. (51)
Next, suppose the matrices QS in (48) satisfy
∑
S⊂ρ
QS = Q, (52)
which is a coalition-level equivalent of (23). Then, for any partition ρ of N , the sum of the
values of the coalitions in ρ
∑
S⊂ρ
vρ(S) = J˜D − J(Kρ) ≤ J˜D − J(KN ) = vN (N ) (53)
where KN is the feedback matrix that satisfies the social optimization (6). To prove (53), note
that
∑
S⊂ρ JS(Kρ) = J(Kρ) when (52) holds, and thus Kρ represents a suboptimal solution
to (6) under the constraint s, resulting in J(Kρ) ≥ J(KN ). Therefore, for any partition ρ, the
value of the grand coalition is at least as large as the sum of the values of the coalitions in ρ,
i.e., (51) holds, and the grand coalition is efficient, which guarantees the formation of the grand
coalition in the cooperative game and justifies Step 1 of Alg. 3 (social optimization) under the
assumption (52).
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